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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff/ Appellee,
Case No. 20030881-CA

vs.
JOHN P. VINANTI,
Defendant/Appellant.

Comes now, the Defendant/Appellant, JOHN P. VINANTI, by and through
his attorney of record, DANA M. FACEMYER, pursuant to Utah Rules of
Appellate Procedure Rule 24(c), provides this Reply to the Brief of the Appellee.

ARGUMENT
I.

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED WHEN IT ADMITTED STATEMENTS
THAT WERE MADE IN RESPONSE TO CUSTODIAL
INTERROGATION, AFTER THE DEFENDANT HAD REQUESTED
AN ATTORNEY, AND WHILE THE DEFENDANT WAS
INTOXICATED.
In the Appellee's Brief the State argues the admission of Defendant's

statements was not error for five reasons; 1] Defendant's claims are inadequately
briefed, 2] Defendant invited evidence of incriminating nod, 3] Defendant was not
in custody when asking the incriminating questions, 4] Defendant's questions
were not the product of interrogation, and 5] Defendant knowingly and
intelligently waived his right to counsel. See Aplee. Br. at 18, 19, 29, 35, and 42.
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A.

Defendant's claims are inadequately briefed

Appellee argues that Defendant's claims are inadequately briefed in that
Defendant failed to cite to the specific point in the record at which the
"incriminating nod" was admitted into evidence, and Defendant failed to identify
the specific "incriminating questions" and to cite were they were admitted into
evidence." See Aplee. Br. at 18.
Speaking of the acceptability of Appellate argument the Utah Supreme
Court said that; "If [the argument is correct] in substance, it should be given effect
and mere technical defects should not defeat the right of appeal. This is in accord
with the generally desirable objective of not placing undue stress on technicalities
where others are not adversely affected." Wood v. Turner, 18 Utah 2d 229, 231
(Utah, 1966). This Court set the bar at which an issue would be considered
inadequately briefed by saying; "An issue is inadequately briefed when the overall
analysis of the issue is so lacking as to shift the burden of research and argument
to the reviewing court." Smith v. Smith, 1999 UT App 370, P8 (Utah Ct. App.,
1999)(internal citations omitted). Furthermore, the Utah courts have traditionally
interpreted statutes regarding appellate procedure in a light favorable to ensuring
that arguments are heard on their merits. "Statutes giving the right of appeal are
liberally construed in furtherance of justice. Such an interpretation as will work a
forfeiture of that right is not favored." U.P.C. v. R.O.A. Gen., Inc., 1999 UT App
303, P28 (Utah Ct. App., 1999), quoting Price v. Western Loan & Sav. Co., 35
Utah 379, 100 P. 677, 679 (1909).
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In the current case counsel incorrectly cited to the wrong part of the record
when discussing this issue. The fact that the "incriminating nod" took place and
was entered into evidence in this case is not at question and is admitted by the
State. See Aplee Br. at 19. And in fact the Appellant did cite to the courts
decision to allow the "incriminating questions" to be entered into the record. See
Aplt. Br. at 6. To dismiss any discussion of this issue due to a technical error
would stand in opposition to the objectives of appellate procedure as interpreted
by the Supreme Court of Utah by placing too much emphasis on technicalities in
the face of pursuing justice. Furthermore, this technical deficiency does not reach
the level set by this Court to determine inadequacy of briefing as it would not
force the Court to take the burden of research and argument. The error is a
technical error as to the citation of a fact that, as stated above, is accepted by both
parties to the appeal. The argument surrounding the fact is adequate and is not
criticized by the state for insufficiency.
B.

Defendant invited evidence of incriminating nod

Appellee argues that Defendant invited introduction of the "incriminating
nod" as the evidence was adduced during counsel's direct examination of
defendant. See Aplee. Br. at 19. It must first be noted that the majority of the
Appellant's argument surrounding the admittance of custodial evidence in
opposition to Miranda deals with the statements made while Defendant was in
custody at the hospital. The "incriminating nod" is only mentioned once through
this discussion and a finding that evidence of an "incriminating nod" would not
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cause Appellant's brief to fail. However, as the initial court error deciding
Defendant was not in custody throughout his hospitalization would include error
that would have allowed evidence of the "incriminating nod/' it will be discussed
in this brief.
Appellee argues that counsel's "inviting" of the error occurred during the
trial. Quoting the Supreme Court of Utah the Appellee argues;
"We have held repeatedly that on appeal, a party cannot take advantage of
an error committed at trial when that party led the trial court into
committing the error. This rule, which is known as the "invited error"
doctrine, has two principal purposes. First, it fortifies our long-established
policy that the trial court should have the first opportunity to address the
claim of error. Second, it discourages parties from intentionally misleading
the trial court so as to preserve a hidden ground for reversal on appeal."
State v. Dunn, 850 P.2d 1201, 1220 (Utah, 1993)(emphasis added).
This is not a case in which defense counsel invited the court into error.
There had been an evidentiary hearing in which it had already been decided that
Defendant's statements would be allowed into evidence. (Reporter's Transcript
July 15, 2003, at 48-51). The error as to the admittance of this evidence had
already been made and defense counsel was forced to go to trial knowing that
these statements would be admitted, and therefore developed a strategy in
accordance. The question defense counsel asked and the response of the
defendant do not meet the two justifications for enforcing a strict "invited error"
rule. In this case the trial court did have the opportunity to decide the issue in the
evidentiary hearing. Furthermore, the decision of the evidentiary hearing is the
basis for the appeal and the source of the error and thus there would have been an
-4-

appealable issue regardless of whether the defense counsel had asked the
"inviting" question.
C.

Defendant was in custody

Appellee argues that Defendant's "incriminating questions" were properly
admitted because Defendant was not in custody at the time he made the questions.
See Aplee. Br. at 21 and 29. Based on four of the five factors set forth in State v.
Gray, the Appellee justifies its argument that Defendant was not in custody by
arguing that 1] the hospital setting was neutral, 2] the officer told defendant he
was not in custody, 3] there was no indicia of arrest, and 4] any post-invocation
questioning was limited to wellbeing. See Aplee. Br. 30, 32, 33, and 34.
a. Hospital setting was not neutral
Appellee argues that the hospital setting was neutral because it was not a
police dominated atmosphere. See Aplee. Br. at 30. The Utah Supreme Court has
set the standard by which to interpret custody by stating; "safeguards prescribed
by Miranda become applicable as soon as a suspect's freedom of action is
curtailed to a degree associated with formal arrest." State v. Mirquet, 914 P.2d
1144, 1146 (Utah, 1996). A site may be considered "neutral" when it is
"substantially less police dominated that that surrounding the kinds of
interrogation at issue in Miranda itself." See Aplee. Br. at 30 (quoting State v.
East, 743 P.2d 1211, 1212 (Utah 1987).
However, the hospital room in the current case can not be easily compared
to the traffic stop that was considered "substantially less police dominated" in
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East. Here, the defendant was in restraints, if even for only part of the time, in a
hospital room, with one door that was being guarded by a police officer who had
accompanied the suspect from the scene of a murder, which officer also felt the
objective need to inform the suspect of his Miranda rights. The state has provided
a handful of out of state decisions involving hospital setting interrogations which
contain some of the aspects of the current fact pattern. However, with all of the
facts that were present in this case, it is obvious that an objective person in the
Defendants position would feel not only unable to leave the hospital room, but
would feel restrained on par with arrest.
A hospital room serves as a restraint on the average individual's freedom,
and when this hospital room also became dominated by the presence of Officer
Mitchell that restraint reached the level of arrest. The average person admitted to
a hospital would feel that they are unable to leave without appropriate
consultation with medical staff. This restraint is not legal custody but obviously
compounds any determination of restraint in the Miranda setting. Here, however,
the inherent restraints of a hospital room were compounded by the presence of a
police officer which dominated the entire medical experience for the Defendant.
The Defendant was accompanied from the scene of a crime by the officer. The
Officer was a constant presence in the room, either by his actual presence, or by
the knowledge that the officer was watching the single access door to the room.
In addition to his physical domination of the hospital room, the air of domination
was heightened when the officer saw fit to give Defendant of the "casual"
-6-

Miranda rights. This exchange would obviously create in any individual the
impression that their movement would be restrained at a level equivalent with
arrest.
b. Telling a suspect that they are not in custody does not overcome
obvious communications to the suspect that they are the focus of the
investigation.
Appellee argues that Defendant was not in custody because he was told he
was not in custody. See Aplee. Br. at 32. One factor used in determining custody
is whether it is communicated to the accused that he was the focus of the
investigation. State v. Gray, 851 P.2d 1217, 1224 (Utah app. 1993). The supreme
court of Utah held that the focus must be communicated. State v. Mirquet, 914
P.2d 1144, 1148 (Utah, 1996). In Mirquet, the defendant was pulled over for a
traffic violation and asked to step into the police vehicle to see the radar display.
In the police vehicle the officer told the defendant that the officer suspected drug
use and incriminating evidence was given by the defendant. The court found that
the situation met the merits of the "focus of the investigation" factor because it did
"not involve an unarticulated suspicion focused on [the defendant]." Id.
Like the officer in Mirquet, Officer Mitchell amply communicated to
Vinanti that he was the focus of the investigation. Officer Mitchell's actions and
words would be more than enough to communicate to an objective witness that
Vinanti was the focus of the investigation. The Officer traveled with Vinanti from
the scene of the crime to the hospital, stayed in close proximity to him for several
hours, questioned him about the crime, and informed the Defendant that he didn't
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have to talk to him and that he had the right to an attorney. All of these actions
and words would easily combine in the mind of a reasonable person that Vinanti
was the focus of the investigation.
c. Post-invocation questioning was not limited to wellbeing
Appellee argues that "incriminating questions" were not the product of
interrogation because the officer's communication with Defendant following
Defendant's request for an attorney was limited to questions regarding
Defendant's wellbeing. See Aplee. Br. at 34. This is simply not true. After the
Defendant requested an attorney, not only did Officer Mitchell tell Defendant that
he wanted to know "what happened as far as what's goin on up to the house and
stuff," (Interview Report of Officer Mitchell, paragraphs 91-94) but also only a
few moments later, while the subject was still fresh in the Defendant's mind, he
said "Do you wanna talk?" (Id. at 114). After asking Defendant "what happened"
and then asking if he wanted to talk, Officer Mitchell continued to discuss the
events of the previous few days and to ask prompting questions, all after
Defendant had clearly requested a lawyer. (Id. at 124-150).
Officer Mitchell asked Vinanti questions about the incident. Then Officer
Mitchell felt that the questioning had gotten to the point that Miranda rights
should be given, even though he failed to adequately warn the Defendant of his
Miranda rights. The Defendant then requested a lawyer, and Officer Mitchell
continued to ask the Defendant to speak about the events of the previous few days.
This was clearly an interrogation, during which the Defendant's requests were not
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being accommodated. Clearly the nature of the questioning in depravation of the
Defendant's desire for counsel lends serious weight to the fact that Defendant was
in police custody at the time the "incriminating questions" were asked.
D.

Questions were not spontaneous, but were instead the product of custodial
interrogation

Appellee argues that "incriminating questions" were not the product of
interrogation because they were spontaneous and not a result of questions made
by the police. See Aplee. Br. at 35. "The term interrogation under Miranda refers
not only to express questioning, but also to any words or actions on the part of the
police (other than those normally attendant to arrest and custody) that the police
should know are reasonably likely to elicit an incriminating response from the
suspect." Rhode Island v. Innis, 446 U.S. 291, 301 (1980).
In the current case, not only did Officer Mitchell ask the Defendant "what
happened" concerning the tragic events of the previous few days, but Officer
Mitchell also engaged the Defendant in prolonged conversation dealing with the
nature of his relationship with the deceased and the events that preceded her
death. (Interview Report of Officer Mitchell, paragraphs 114, 124-150). This is
clearly interrogation by questioning, and interrogation by "actions on the part of
police that the police should know are reasonably likely to elicit an incriminating
response." The Defendant was clearly drunk, and Officer Mitchell's attempts at
engaging the Defendant in conversation relating to his relationship to the deceased
and the events preceding her death are clear attempt to ensure that the already
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intoxicated and confused mind of the defendant would reveal something
incriminating which could be used against him.
E.

Waiver of defendant's right to counsel was not knowing and intelligent

Appellee argues that "incriminating questions" were admissible because
Defendant impliedly had knowingly and intelligently waived his Right to Counsel
as protected by Miranda, See Aplee. Br. at 39. It is the State's argument, and the
law that to determine competency to knowingly and intelligently waive Miranda
rights the police and the court must focus on the defendant's behavior at the time
of the waiver. See State v. Orme, 677 So.2d 258, 262 (Fla. 1996), State v.
Dutchie, 969 P.2d 422, 429 (Utah, 1998), and State v. Archuleta, 850 P.2d 1232,
1239 (Utah, 1993).
However, in opposition to the states position, and the testimony of the
police, an analysis of the transcript of Officer Mitchell's tape recorded interview
with the Defendant show's clearly that the Defendant's behavior exhibited an
inability to make a knowing and intelligent waiver of Miranda rights. Reading
through the questions and responses from Officer Mitchell and the Defendant it is
clear that Defendant was unable to concentrate on one subject for any substantial
amount of time. He skips from subject to subject failing to answer direct
questions from Officer Mitchell. In response to question's about the Defendant's
attorney the defendant answers; "go[t] to pee." (Interview Report of Officer
Mitchell, paragraph 73). He was even unconscious that he had a catheter
attached. (Id. at 74-75). After a second request for attorney information the
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defendant asked instead about the deceased. (Id. at 76-78). The pages of the
interview surrounding the attempt at Miranda warnings jump from topic to topic
without Officer Mitchell ever to clearly inform Defendant of his Miranda rights
due to Defendant's inability to stay on topic. (Id. 34-150).
Anyone who has had experience with intoxicated people can clearly see
that Defendant is extremely drunk and unable to engage in coherent conversation.
If someone is so drunk that their mental state disallows an Officer's attempt to
inform that person of their Miranda rights, that person is clearly too drunk to
waive the same.
It is clear from the record and from case law that Defendant was in custody
at the time of the "incriminating questions." The setting was dominated by the
presence of Officer Mitchell, Officer Mitchell's investigation was clearly focused
on the Defendant, and Officer Mitchell questioned and conversed with Defendant
in a clear attempt to uncover incriminating facts. The "incriminating questions"
were not spontaneous as the defendant was subject to interrogation at the time,
and the state has not shown a clear break in causation between the Officer's
clearly illegal questions and the statements that were brought out in trial. It is
further clear, and not argued against by the state in the Appellee Brief, that Officer
Mitchell was never able to give Defendant clear Miranda warnings. Because,
warnings were not clearly given, and because Defendant's behavior clearly
expressed that he was intoxicated beyond the ability to have coherent
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conversation, it is clear that Defendant never knowingly and intelligently waived
his Miranda rights after requesting an attorney.
II.

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED WHEN IT ALLOWED PLAINTIFF TO
PRESENT EVIDENCE OF PRIOR BAD ACTS IN VIOLATION OF
UTAH RULES OF EVIDENCE 404(B), WHICH ACTS WERE OVERLY
PREJUDICIAL RATHER THAN PROBATIVE.
Appellee argues that admission of Defendant's Prior Bad Acts was without

error because Appellant failed to provide an adequate record for review. See
Aplee. Br. at 44. "If [the argument is correct] in substance, it should be given
effect and mere technical defects should not defeat the right of appeal. This is in
accord with the generally desirable objective of not placing undue stress on
technicalities where others are not adversely affected." Wood v. Turner, 18 Utah
2d 229, 231 (Utah, 1966). "Statutes giving the right of appeal are liberally
construed in furtherance of justice. Such an interpretation as will work a forfeiture
of that right is not favored." U.P.C. v. R.O.A. Gen., Inc., 1999 UT App 303, P28
(Utah Ct. App., 1999), quoting Price v. Western Loan & Sav. Co., 35 Utah 379,
100 P. 677,679(1909).
The Defendant was unable to site to the hearing at which the decision
regarding Prior Bad Acts was decided because that hearing was not recorded.
However, the Brief of the Appellant does cite to a specific place in a subsequent
evidentiary hearing where the court specifically states which prior bad acts are
going to be allowed into court. See Aplt Br. at 16. If the court does not hear this
issue on the merits due to inadequacy of the record outside of the control of the
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defendant, it will be against the objectives of the court and the intent of appeals
that justice be ensured. The court can clearly see the prior bad acts from the
record and has been given the appropriate law in the Appellant's brief. See Aplt
Br. 16-18. This court should find that it has the ability to decide this case
regardless of errors of record to fulfill the mandates of justice.
CONCLUSION
The Court should find that the trial court erred when it admitted
"incriminating questions" made by the Defendant. These questions were made in
response to custodial interrogation, after the defendant had requested an attorney,
and while the defendant was intoxicated.
The Court should find that the trial court erred when it allowed plaintiff to
present evidence of prior bad acts in violation of Utah Rules of Evidence 404(b),
which acts were overly prejudicial rather than probative.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED thig^ ffi^day of Ut4fl$y
C_ DANA^I«ACEMYER
Attorney for Defendant/Appellant
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, 2005.
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